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Introduction
The social and public welfare issues currently 
facing the United States and the world are stag-
gering. Poverty, homelessness, eroding school 
systems, and global climate change are just a few. 
Such “wicked” problems challenge governments, 
foundations, and nonprofits as they work to ad-
dress them effectively, equitably, economically, 
and sustainably. In its response, philanthropy has 
an opportunity to foster an internal and external 
culture of collaboration, candor, and community 
voice. Using the right strategies and comprehen-
sive tools, today’s philanthropists can improve 
leadership, create effective organizations, and 
build powerful partnerships devoted to achieving 
profound social change.
This article describes a wicked problems framework 
that can be used in the planning, implementation, 
and evaluation of programs that address these 
complex issues. It specifically focuses on how the 
wicked problems frame may be applied to public 
policy advocacy evaluation. Two policy initiatives 
are described and used to illustrate some of the 
ways in which a wicked problems framework can 
be a beneficial approach to evaluation (as well as to 
all parts of the grantmaking cycle). The two policy 
efforts are (1) a legislative campaign supported 
by The Atlantic Philanthropies that focused on 
improving and expanding national health insur-
ance for children (State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program) and (2) an advocacy initiative supported 
by the W. K. Kellogg Foundation that was intended 
to strengthen the federal Farm Bill and expand con-
servation and improve healthy food for the poor.
Key Points
· Many of the social issues private foundations and 
other philanthropies attempt to address — pov-
erty, homelessness, global climate change — are 
wicked problems. That is, they defy easy defini-
tion, lack permanent solutions, and have multiple 
stakeholders.
· The wicked problems framework helps make 
explicit the challenging nature of the issue to be 
addressed, requires an inclusive style of leadership 
that seeks stakeholder involvement, and demands 
candid exchange among stakeholders about the 
nature of the problem and effectiveness of efforts 
to address it.
· A wicked problems framework provides a set of 
criteria and questions for evaluators of  advocacy 
efforts to ask all the other stakeholders to asses: 
(1) the type and quality of leadership provided by 
the funder, grantees, and other stakeholders in 
terms of involving stakeholders and fostering a 
culture of candor; (2) the degree to which leader-
ship and others were candid about the problem, 
the effectiveness of the strategies, and stakehold-
er contributions; and (3) quality and contributions 
of stakeholders.
· Two recent public policy advocacy efforts and their 
evaluation are used to highlight some of the issues 
a wicked problems framework makes apparent, 
and the possible ramifications if such a framework 
had been used from the initial stages of the advo-
cacy efforts.
John Sherman, M.P.H., and Gayle Peterson, M.S.P., 
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The Wicked Problems Frame
What Is It?
One function of public policy is to ameliorate, if 
not “solve,” social justice issues. In many cases, 
such issues meet the definition of what Rittel and 
Webber (1973) termed “wicked problems.” They 
identified 10 properties of a wicked problem:
1. It is impossible to write a well-defined prob-
lem statement about wicked problems.
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule; the 
search for solutions never ends.
3. Choosing a solution to a wicked problem is a 
matter of judgment.
4. Solutions to wicked problems generate unex-
pected consequences over time and measure-
ment is hard.
5. Solutions to wicked problems have conse-
quences that cannot be undone.
6. Wicked problems do not have an exhaustively 
describable set of potential solutions.
7. Every wicked problem is unique, without 
precedent, and thus experience does not help 
you address it.
8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be 
a symptom of another problem; they have no 
single root cause.
9. A wicked problem involves many stakehold-
ers, who all will have different ideas about the 
problem, its causes, and its solutions.
10. Problem solvers dealing with a wicked issue 
are held liable for the consequences of any ac-
tions.
How Can It Help Foundations?
The wicked problems construct is particularly 
useful for foundations supporting public policy 
strategies. It serves to improve the effectiveness of 
a foundation’s programs because it
Creates the need for the funder to be explicit •	
about the nature of the underlying social justice 
issue it is trying to address and why a public 
policy advocacy strategy is reasonable to ad-
dress the social justice issue.
Ensures that the foundation has sought out •	
appropriate involvement from stakeholders. In 
the politics of public policy, who defines the 
problem (thus, explicitly or implicitly assert-
ing the problem’s cause) and who develops 
solutions to it, are critical factors in determin-
ing who is an effective participant in inform-
ing and influencing the final policy outcome. . 
One of the places a foundation has some input 
in addressing a wicked problem is through 
the stakeholders (e.g., grantees) it chooses to 
support and thus who will be at the negotiat-
ing table.
Nancy Roberts, professor of strategic manage-
ment and professor of national security affairs 
at the Naval Postgraduate School, notes that 
“people’s personal preferences, backgrounds, 
educational experiences, and organizational affili-
ations” shape the way each person defines, assigns 
causation, and offers solutions to wicked prob-
lems (Roberts, 2001)). Those supported stake-
holders, when given the time and resources to 
participate deeply and consistently in an advocacy 
effort, have the opportunity to be heard, accom-
modated, and even become leaders themselves. 
Thus, the wicked problems frame reminds and 
requires a funder to pay careful attention both to 
the stakeholders it chooses to support and to its 
rationale for supporting certain stakeholders (e.g., 
nonprofit advocates) over others. The success, 
quality, and longevity of the public policy solution 
in part depend on the quality and integrity of 
stakeholder involvement.
Just as important, the foundation needs to 
recognize that it is a stakeholder with a point of 
view expressed in its vision, mission, theory of 
change, programmatic outcomes, and grantmak-
ing criteria. At the individual level, the managing 
program director also must be aware of their 
influential stakeholder’s role. As a stakeholder 
with significant power (in terms of funding), what 
and how the foundation and individual program 
director communicates to potential grant seekers 
and grantees influences how they approach the 
funder and, perhaps, how they address the wicked 
problem.
Shares “the solution” (or the supported public •	
policy strategy) among stakeholders. This fun-
damental acknowledgement of greater stake-
holder involvement creates its own benefits, 
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The wicked problems frame reminds 
and requires a funder to pay careful 
attention both to the stakeholders 
it chooses to support and to its 
rationale for supporting certain 
stakeholders over others. 
including (1) increased candor among stake-
holders and (2) a more distributed leadership 
and decision-making model that requires the 
program director to seek out and listen to 
divergent perspectives from within and outside 
of the organization. As solutions are more 
collectively owned (wicked problems don’t go 
away, but significant change can be achieved), 
the ability to discuss the tough questions will 
require openness and honesty about what is 
and isn’t working so that strategies can be fine-
tuned. This process can increase the efficacy of 
the public policy advocacy effort.
Improves communication, internally and exter-•	
nally, regarding the nature of the issues being 
addressed and the reasons why solving such 
problems are challenging. The wicked problems 
frame reminds funders of these responsibilities 
and that no matter how successful the public 
policy outcome, the problem does not have 
a permanent solution. In fact, regardless of 
the action taken, it is likely that another set of 
problems unforeseen (and unforeseeable) will 
surface. The wicked problems frame forces 
funders (and their evaluators) to acknowledge 
that in the policy advocacy realm, it is difficult 
to predict what is going to happen, much less 
when it will happen. In other words, it keeps 
funders humble and evaluators sane.
This frame also fits well with John Kingdon’s 
(2001) ideas about policy agendas and the various 
independent policy-making streams — the prob-
lem to be solved, possible policies to address it, 
and the political context or climate that makes it 
possible (or not) to align a problem with a policy 
solution. By considering public policy advocacy 
through the wicked problems frame, funders 
are asked to consider each of these streams. As 
a result, they have a better understanding of 
what is possible, the timeframe for realizing such 
possibilities, and how to design an appropriate 
evaluation.
Why Is the Wicked Problems Frame 
Relevant to Public Policy Advocacy 
Evaluation?
The ability of private foundations to legally sup-
port nonprofit groups to influence legislation 
is well established.1 Public charity/nonprofit 
advocacy, lobbying (direct and grassroots), and 
other efforts to inform and influence specific 
legislation are important tools for advocates. In 
turn, understanding the efficacy and the array 
of proactive and reactive activities associated 
with any legislative advocacy campaign can help 
both funders and grantees. The right evaluation 
at the right time that asks the right questions of 
the right players can yield lessons for funder and 
grantees. 
Recent efforts to understand initiation, manage-
ment, and evaluation of public policy advocacy 
grantmaking have focused on the organizational 
and system levels. Much of the recent literature, 
meetings, and conversations on evaluation of 
public policy advocacy have focused on method-
ologies for evaluating organizations’ public policy 
advocacy efforts.2 These efforts are also being 
discussed in the context of systems approaches to 
framing and evaluating social change efforts (Par-
sons, 2007; Richardson, 1991). Similar to what 
Kingdon (1995) proposed, these approaches view 
policy making as a complex adaptive system.
Efforts in both these areas have yielded important 
results: (1) Policy funders, both experienced and 
new, gain a deeper understanding of the role of 
advocacy groups and how public policy is created, 
nurtured, and ultimately manifested (whether 
1 See Internal Revenue Service letter to Charity Lobbying in 
the Public Interest, December 9, 2004.
2 See, for example, Alliance for Justice, Innonet, and Ameri-
can Evaluation Association conference agenda over the 
past three years.
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TABLE 1 The Wicked Problem Nature of Poverty and Two Public Policy Strategy Solutions
Wicked problem criteria Social issues and policy strategies — SCHIP and Farm Bill
It is impossible to write a well-
defined problem statement about 
wicked problems.
A well-defined problem statement cannot be written easily for either 
the SCHIP or the Farm Bill efforts. Both are attempting to address and 
ameliorate complex social justice issues centered on the causes and 
consequences of poverty.
Wicked problems have no stopping 
rule; the search for solutions never 
ends.
If the children’s health insurance issue or lack of access to healthy foods 
is “solved” through a public policy action, other issues related to poverty 
such as inadequate educational systems, insufficient job market, lack of 
an adequate supply of healthy foods, and lack of an adequate supply of 
affordable healthy foods emerge or remain; thus, the solutions to those 
issues then become paramount.
Choosing a solution to a wicked 
problem is a matter of judgment.
Judgment is driven by what is “known” at any one time about possible 
solutions combined with the individual, group, or political party that has 
the clout to make or force to choose the solution. In the case of SCHIP, a 
judgment was made to only pursue health insurance for children and not 
for all individuals, families, and adults. For food, the judgment was made 
that access to healthy foods (excluding school foods) was a market force, 
private sector issue and not one to be addressed through public policy.
Solutions to wicked problems 
generate unexpected consequences 
over time and measurement is hard.
What are the unforeseen or unforeseeable results, intended or unintended, 
of having healthier children due to increased access to health care or 
better foods? What are the results of not having such access?
Solutions to wicked problems have 
consequences that cannot be 
undone.
For many social justice issues, the result of any ameliorating strategy may 
ultimately mean increased or reduced quality of life, or greater or fewer 
deaths. Moreover, the culture of policy making calls for compromise 
and trade-offs. What are the consequences of such trade-offs for the 
immediate policy strategy, other public policy efforts addressing other 
social issues, and ultimately for those individuals, communities, and society 
overall that suffer from the underlying wicked problem(s)?
Wicked problems do not have an 
exhaustively describable set of 
potential solutions.
Relates to the first criterion in that without a well-defined problem 
statement, there cannot be well-defined and finite solutions. 
Every wicked problem is unique, 
without precedent, thus experience 
does not help you address it.
Also related to the first criterion.
Every wicked problem can be 
considered to be a symptom of 
another problem; they have no single 
root cause.
Also related to the first criterion.
A wicked problem involves many 
stakeholders, who all will have 
different ideas about the problem, its 
causes, and its solutions.
SCHIP’s stakeholders included children’s advocates, universal health 
care supports, pediatrician groups, the AMA, health insurance industry, 
and limited government advocates. Some of the Farm Bill stakeholders 
included antihunger advocates, environmental advocates, grain commodity 
groups, livestock groups, and agricultural trade associations
Problem solvers dealing with a 
wicked issue are held liable for the 
consequences of any actions.
In the world of foundations, funders look to the grantees to be accountable 
for their public policy advocacy efforts — this despite the multiple, external 
factors influencing policy creation, implementation, and impacts.
Note. SCHIP = State Children’s Health Insurance Program; AMA = American Medical Association.
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“The bane of evaluation is a poorly 
designed program”
defeated, victorious, or the all-too-common in-
between result). (2) Advocacy groups (and their 
evaluators) have some standardized tools to track 
and report their advocacy performance in ways 
that funders understand.3 (3) Placing policy work 
in a systems context has revealed the complex na-
ture of policy change and has articulated the need 
to understand deeply the participants and context 
in which policy work occurs.
The wicked problems frame complements the 
organizational and systems evaluation models by 
asking the evaluators to look at the choices and 
decisions made in the upstream parts of grant-
making, including program design, communica-
tion, and implementation. A lack of adequate 
definition and intent that is common in these 
early stages causes problems in the downstream 
evaluation design and implementation (as Ricardo 
Mallet has observed, “the bane of evaluation is a 
poorly designed program”(WK Kellogg, 2001)).
The intent of the wicked problems frame is to 
help the evaluator seek more basic answers to 
questions about several aspects of a program 
and the type of leadership provided by the foun-
dation around those aspects, including (1) the 
nature of the social justice problems attempt-
ing to be addressed by a public policy strategy; 
(2) the rationale for choosing a public policy 
strategy over other strategies; (3) the stakehold-
ers involved in those discussions, how they 
were involved, and when they were involved; 
and (4) the quality of, and level of candor in, the 
communications and outreach to grant seek-
ers, other stakeholders, and the community. (A 
robust theory of change may capture some of 
these pieces; however, our experience tells us 
that theories of change rarely do.)
3 We believe that most experienced and successful advo-
cacy groups know how to track their performance for their 
own purposes, including policy research and other prepa-
ratory activities; education and outreach to membership 
and the public; the ability to perform power analyses, target 
and inform the policy decision makers (e.g., bureaucrats or 
legislators), and understand if and when the opportunity 
exists to advocate a policy change; and policy success. 
The current evaluation efforts have been to capture this 
knowledge in ways that can be fed to, and understood by, 
funders and others.
The Atlantic and W.K.K.F. Efforts
Over the past several years, we have been the 
cluster evaluators for two significant federal pub-
lic policy advocacy efforts supported by the At-
lantic Philanthropies (Atlantic) and the W. K. Kel-
logg Foundation (W.K.K.F.). Part of our work with 
Atlantic was to evaluate its efforts to reauthorize 
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP). Our W.K.K.F. work comprised an evalu-
ation of its efforts to inform the 2008 federal Farm 
Bill. Each of these efforts had different approach-
es, expectations, and types of grantees. Next, we 
discuss why the issues addressed by these efforts 
are wicked problems, provide an overview of each 
effort, and analyze the lessons learned from them 
using the wicked problems frame.
Why Are These Issues Wicked Problems?
Consider the underlying issues the two founda-
tions’ strategies were attempting to address. In 
both cases, these issues and the ways in which 
they manifest in people’s lives individually, in 
their families, and in their communities are 
wicked problems. Table 1 compares the wicked 
problems criteria with these public policy strategy 
responses.
Atlantic Philanthropies: Childhood Poverty and 
Lack of Health Insurance for Children
The costs of childhood poverty to children, 
families, and communities are well documented: 
impoverishment, reduced productivity, increased 
crime, and higher health risks (Holzer, Schanzen-
bach, Duncan, & Ludwig, 2007; U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2007). An important conse-
quence of poverty is the lack of health insurance 
for children (high health insurance costs drive 
families into poverty, and poverty keeps families 
from accessing insurance). In 2007, 11 percent of 
all children in the United States (8.9 million) had 
no health insurance. Uninsured children are more 
likely to go without immunizations and miss 
school as a result of untreated illness. Due to their 
Sherman and Peterson
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decreased access to primary and preventive care, 
they are also more likely to end up seeking care 
in emergency rooms (Center for Family and Chil-
dren, Georgetown University, 2009). Atlantic sup-
ported federal policy advocacy efforts to improve 
one of most significant options that poor children 
have to access health insurance, SCHIP. Improv-
ing SCHIP was a public policy strategy used in 
response to one manifestation of an underlying 
wicked problem (poverty).
W. K. Kellogg Foundation: Rural and Urban 
Poverty and Lack of Access to Healthy Food
Inadequate access to healthy, affordable food is a 
serious and widespread issue across the coun-
try. An estimated 25 percent of U.S. counties 
are low-access areas and 13 percent are “food 
deserts” (regions, urban or rural, with little or no 
access to foods needed to maintain a healthy diet) 
(Morton & Blanchard, 2007). Both the limited 
access to healthy, affordable food and its high cost 
contribute to poor nutrition and obesity among 
children and adults in poor communities (Morton 
& Blanchard, 2007; Rundle et al., 2009).
The Farm Bill offered one strategy (public policy) 
to address a classic wicked problem (lack of access 
to healthy food). A consequence of this strategy 
would require more such food to be grown and 
distributed to poor urban and rural communities. 
This, in turn, would not only require a sufficient 
supply of farmers in appropriate locations but 
also the infrastructure to process and distribute it 
in ways that ensure quality and affordability. Such 
multiple, complex consequences are a classic 
aspect of a wicked problem.
How Did Atlantic and W.K.K.F. Address the 
Issues?
Essentially, both Atlantic and Kellogg wanted spe-
cific policy-content and policy-process outcomes. 
These, along with their goals, theory of change, 
and other key aspects of their efforts are summa-
rized in Table 2.
Atlantic Philanthropies and SCHIP
As outlined in the theory of change for its Disad-
vantaged Children and Youth (DCY) Programme, 
Atlantic invests in advocacy capacity in order to 
(1) impact immediate, short-term policy initia-
tives and (2) create and exploit potential policy 
opportunities. Atlantic aims to improve indi-
vidual and collective capacity to conduct policy 
campaigns focused on learning, health, and 
access to benefits. The recent effort to reauthorize 
SCHIP is one such campaign. As with capacity 
building, Atlantic identified specific outcomes for 
this effort congruent with overall policy advocacy 
outcomes for its DCY Programme.
Context. Created by the Balanced Budget Act of 
1997, SCHIP was due to expire in 2007. It was 
designed as a federal-state funding partnership 
to offer health insurance coverage to children in 
modest-income families who are unable to afford 
private insurance, but whose incomes are too 
high to qualify for Medicaid assistance. States 
were given latitude on implementing SCHIP, 
including key contentious issues such as income-
level eligibility, whether adults of eligible should 
be covered, how states are allotted SCHIP funds, 
and whether immigrants’ children should be 
covered. 
The players. The SCHIP reauthorization effort 
involved a core of eight Atlantic grantees. Several 
trade associations and other nonprofit groups 
were also active participants. Funded by several 
foundations, including Atlantic, the David and 
Lucile Packard Foundation (Packard), the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation, and Wellspring Advi-
sors, the grantees and other participants formed 
networks focused solely on SCHIP and assisted in 
shifting the focus of broad health care coalitions 
to the SCHIP reauthorization. Atlantic grantees 
were involved in at least five such coalitions and 
networks. Some of these were involved in the 
original SCHIP efforts, others joined as the reau-
thorization effort began in 2006, and the remain-
der arrived later in the game.
Outcome. Between October and December 2007, 
President Bush vetoed two versions of SCHIP. In 
late December 2007, he signed a bill extending the 
current SCHIP for 18 months. In January 2009, 
President Obama signed a SCHIP bill almost 
identical to the one that the previous president 
had twice vetoed.
Wicked Problems
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TABLE 2 Summary of Atlantic’s SCHIP and Kellogg’s Farm Bill Public Policy Advocacy
Key grant and 
initiative issues Atlantic philanthropies and SCHIP W.K. Kellogg and Farm Bill
Theory of change Better public policy at the local, state, 
and federal levels is critical to improving 
the lives of disadvantaged children and 
youth.
Support new models of community-based 
and community-owned food systems 
enterprises and inform new models of food 
systems policy.
Goal Make lasting changes in the lives of 
disadvantaged children and youth 
through policies and programs that keep 
them engaged in learning, healthy, and 
connected to family support.
Policy reforms are successfully enacted and 
increase — at least to a steady stream — the 
trickle of the Farm Bill’s resources dedicated 
to the foundation’s vision of healthy, 
environmentally sound, equitable food.
Outcomes: policy 
content
SCHIP reauthorization legislation 
that protects, and optimally expands 
and improves, the program without 
undermining such coverage in Medicaid. 
It trusted the grantees to determine what 
an “optimal” SCHIP looked like.
More Farm Bill resources to be dedicated 
to the foundation’s vision of healthy, 
environmentally sound, equitable food.
Outcomes: policy 
advocacy process
Stronger leadership and better 
coordination among key national 
advocacy organizations.
Work collaboratively, to build a forum for 
collaboration around agriculture and food 
systems policy work that endures beyond the 
period of the grant.
Improved capacity among state 
organizations to advocate for and 
implement health-coverage legislation.
Increased representation of nontraditional 
allies and increased collaboration among 
advocates and health care providers.
Type of grants General operating Project — Farm Bill
Number of grantees 13 5 core
Number of partners Approximately 32 core partners, several 
dozen peripheral
13 subgrantees, 300 supporting
Collaborative Network Network
Strategies Public education Public education
Media Media
Briefings with Hill staff Briefings with Hill staff
Direct lobbying — grantee Direct lobbying — grantee
Grassroots lobbying Grassroots lobbying
Evaluation
 Project Some Yes
 Cluster Yes Yes
Note. SCHIP = State Children’s Health Insurance Program.
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W. K. Kellogg Foundation and the Farm Bill
For more than 10 years, the W. K. Kellogg Foun-
dation has supported efforts to inform domestic 
agricultural policies, including Farm Bill reform. 
Policy reform is part of W.K.K.F.’s Food and 
Society Initiative (FAS) and its vision of a future 
food system that provides a safe and nutritious 
food supply, grown in a manner that protects 
individual health and the environment while add-
ing economic and social value to rural and urban 
communities. This future food system is one in 
which “good food” — that is, healthy, green, fair, 
and affordable food — is abundant and available 
to all segments of society.
The Farm Bill. The 2008 Farm Bill is the most 
recent reauthorization of a statute created in 
1933. It has been reauthorized periodically, usu-
ally every five to six years, and often given a new 
name, with accompanying changes of content and 
thrust. It has a long history as a cornerstone of 
federal agriculture and rural policy and its many 
proponents (interest groups and in Congress) 
have had decades to become entrenched. One of 
the most critical changes in the Farm Bill oc-
curred in 1977, when food stamps were added to 
it. This changed the political calculations signifi-
cantly by expanding the Farm Bill’s constituencies 
and their advocates.
Understanding the funding of the Farm Bill’s 
various key titles is critical to understanding the 
politics surrounding the legislation. Over the past 
few decades, the nutrition title, particularly food 
stamps, has grown to dominate the Farm Bill bud-
get. Nutrition constitutes 68 percent of spending 
in the 2008 Farm Bill  — a total of $209 billion 
over five years. The other two major spending 
(entitlement) titles, commodities and conserva-
tion, are a distant second and third representing 
12 percent and 8 percent, respectively, of overall 
spending (see the Figure;  Congressional Budget 
Office, 2008)
The players. Due to the wide range of policy issues 
at play in the Farm  Bill — agricultural markets, 
energy, rural economic development, nutrition, 
and feeding hungry people — and an equally 
wide range of the possible solutions to a diverse 
set of problems, the stakeholders involved are 
numerous and varied. Even the number interested 
in those aspects of the Farm Bill  that could be 
related directly to W.K.K.F.’s good food vision 
are significant and involve many titles of the bill. 
In a tight budget environment with a zero-sum 
outcome as a given, the trade-offs among good 
food advocates and the other powerful stakehold-
ers were real.
Outcomes. Through an intense and involved col-
laborative process, the effort of W.K.K.F.-funded 
organizations, called the Farm and Food Policy 
Project (FFPP), constructed a set of priorities. 
These priorities were divided into five areas with 
a total of 38 priority issues involving 11 of the 
15 Farm Bill titles. Twenty-three of the 38 were 
fully included in the Farm Bill, seven were partly 
included, and eight were not included. Regard-
ing funding for fiscal year 2008–2012, successful 
FFPP priorities included a net gain of $5 billion in 
mandatory spending from the 2002 Farm Bill and 
an additional net gain of $1.9 billion in discretion-
ary funding. These amounts are small in compari-
son to the overall bill’s five-year budget of $307 
billion. Relatively large gains were made, however, 
in some of the smaller programs important to 
W.K.K.F..
What Are the Lessons?
In evaluating these two significant public policy 
efforts, what kind of light is shed on addressing 
wicked problems? Two critical lessons emerge. 
FIGURE 1  2008 Farm Bill Spending, in Billions of Dollars
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A funder’s theory of change and 
the way it defines the outcomes of 
its public policy initiative is the 
beginning of how it judges what the 
possible universe of solutions will be.
Both revolve around the decisions made in the 
early stages of developing a grantmaking pro-
gram: (1) the importance of the funder defining 
what a successful program looks like; and (2) how 
ideas of success (as defined by the funder) shape, 
and are shaped by, the other stakeholders.
Define Success: Be Clear About What  
You Want
Rittel and Webber (1973) stated that one aspect 
of wicked problems is “Choosing a solution to 
a wicked problem is a matter of judgment.” A 
funder’s theory of change and the way it defines 
the outcomes of its public policy initiative is the 
beginning of how it judges what the possible uni-
verse of solutions will be. For both Atlantic and 
WKKF, there was a mixed set of judgments as to 
the content of the policy outcome and the types 
of interactions between the grantees and other 
like-minded stakeholders. Thus, this judgment 
establishes the universe of possible grant seek-
ers and grantees. Some types of nonprofit groups 
will not fit the theory of change or may not agree 
with the foundation’s public policy goals. Just 
as important, a funder may draw new types of 
organizations into its sphere. Either way, the po-
tential universe of possible grantees is bound and 
constrained as soon as the goals and subsequent 
strategies are set.
Due to Atlantic’s tight focus of its DCY advocacy 
efforts around health (e.g. SCHIP) and its desire 
to have immediate impact on specific policy op-
portunities, its universe of potential grantees was 
limited to D.C.-based organizations. For the most 
part, despite the initial setbacks, this universe of 
groups was successful from a policy-content out-
come perspective, because the groups ultimately 
won on all their major issues. In terms of build-
ing advocacy capacity and developing leadership, 
however, the outcomes of Atlantic’s investment 
were not as clear. This was not due to a failure of 
the grantees but rather to the types of grantees 
initially selected; the lack of clear baseline data 
around current advocacy capacity and leadership 
against which changes could be assessed; and 
the lack of clearly defined advocacy capacity and 
leadership development expectations communi-
cated to the grantees. 
W.K.K.F. thought it was being explicit by the way 
it defined the outcomes of the Farm Bill effort: to 
have an impact on the content of the Farm Bill 
and to build a broader, more sustained coalition 
of good food interests. Although both of these 
were understood in theory by the grantees and 
their partners, the importance they attached to 
different aspects of the Farm Bill varied, thus 
giving a wide array of grantee interest around 
how they perceived the problem. Grantees viewed 
the problem differently — some saw it as a food 
insecurity issue, others as a lack of enough food 
to feed the hungry, as insufficient conservation 
practices on agriculture lands, or as industrial 
agriculture run amok.
The lack of a specific common framework and un-
derstanding, resulted in the grantees developing 
their own ways to approach the FFPP effort:
Reform versus incremental change.•	  Some 
grantees thought W.K.K.F. was committed to 
the reformist agenda (as pursued by another 
coalition of stakeholders), whereas others were 
focused on more incremental changes. Regard-
less, reformists and incrementalists assumed 
that they were going to get more resources for 
specific titles and programs.
Policy change or improved collaboration•	 . 
Some grantees were focused on the collabora-
tive successes of FFPP, others on the policy 
outcomes.
Time frame for success•	 . The time frame in 
which success was to be achieved was another 
issue (regardless of whether success was policy 
change or improved collaboration). Was it 
until the passage of the 2008 Farm Bill? Was 
it longer? If so, how much longer? In the case 
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The stakeholders to whom funders 
must pay close attention are 
nonprofits that represent or act as 
proxies for larger interests.
of FFPP, the lack of a problem definition led 
to a search for solutions that all could agree 
upon. Though not insignificant, results were 
incremental, with a somewhat larger stream 
of resources and policies in alignment with 
W.K.K.F.’s vision.
Although the policy vehicle (in this case, the Farm 
Bill) was susceptible to ambiguity, the lessons of 
better defining what goals and the desired time-
line remain real. Such clarity affects who decides 
to come to the table and thus how the policy ad-
vocacy effort is shaped, which in turn affects the 
immediate policy outcome, consequences of that 
outcome, and future policy advocacy efforts on 
farm policy and equitable access to healthy food.
Attend to Stakeholders: Be Clear About 
Who You Want
Roberts (2000) identified three ways wicked prob-
lems can be addressed — authoritatively, com-
petitively, or collaboratively. The effectiveness of 
each depends on the wickedness of the problem, 
the number of stakeholders, and how power is 
distributed among them. In general, the greater 
the number of stakeholders and the more equally 
power and decision making is distributed, the 
more a collaborative model for addressing wicked 
problems is warranted.
The active stakeholders in most public policy 
efforts are the decision makers themselves, their 
staff (who, by virtue of serving as gatekeepers and 
filters, often have a significant amount of power), 
and those parties directly impacted by the policy 
(usually in the form of their hired proxies, for 
example, lobbyists). The stakeholders to whom 
funders must pay close attention are nonprofits 
that represent or act as proxies for larger inter-
ests. Within the realm of their control, Atlantic 
and W.K.K.F. sought collaborative relationships 
with their stakeholders. Although grantees and 
others did work collaboratively in some ways, this 
was not a consistent approach.
Atlantic
Atlantic paid attention to two sets of stakeholders: 
nonprofits involved in national-level, disadvan-
taged children and youth policy efforts (and the 
subset of these that became grantees) and other 
funders involved in related issues.
Nonprofit advocacy groups. Atlantic supported 
nonprofit stakeholders that had significant 
amount of policy advocacy experience (and ef-
fectiveness) at the federal level and had a progres-
sive agenda for disadvantaged children and youth. 
Within this broad group, Atlantic supported three 
key nonprofit stakeholder groups: (1) research- 
and policy-wise groups that advocated policies 
affecting low- and moderate-income people in 
general; (2) groups that were solely focused on 
research and advocacy of public policies affecting 
children; and (3) groups focused on building the 
advocacy and other capacities of their member 
groups.
Atlantic chose not to fund directly the state- or 
local-level groups. Some of its national grantees 
had membership in the states and communities, 
whereas others had effective working relation-
ships with state and local groups. Some grant-
ees were intermediaries and awarded portions 
of their Atlantic funding to the state and local 
groups they thought could most benefit the 
grantee’s efforts. Atlantic relied on its grantees to 
determine the worthiness and alignment of these 
state- and local-level subgrantees with Atlantic’s 
goals.
In addition to the types of groups funded, At-
lantic wanted its grantees and others to be more 
collaborative. The Atlantic program officers’ 
experiences as advocates and funders informed 
their view that inadequate collaboration and 
partnerships usually led to less-than-optimal 
use of resources and policy outcomes. Atlantic 
believed that closer partnership among advocacy 
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groups would lead to better outcomes and less 
infighting.
Funders. Atlantic also was aware of and commu-
nicated with many of the other funders involved 
in working with disadvantaged children. Though 
only a few were involved actively in policy advo-
cacy, Atlantic was one of several funders and was 
not seen as the lead funder.
W.K.K.F.
W.K.K.F. paid attention to the same two sets of 
stakeholders as Atlantic. However, the type of 
groups within those stakeholder sets was signifi-
cantly different. Much of this was due to the issue 
and the history of W.K.K.F.’s engagement with it.
Nonprofit advocacy groups. W.K.K.F.’s decisions 
on the types of groups to support in the 2008 
Farm Bill effort were shaped considerably by its 
previous Farm  Bill experiences. The most signifi-
cant lessons learned in this previous work were 
related to the diversity (in all manners) of the 
stakeholders and how well they worked together. 
In 2004, for example, the foundation issued a rare 
request for proposals to diversify its applicant 
base and to make explicit its desire for a multi-
issued collaborative approach to the Farm Bill. 
This broader coalition was particularly important 
as W.K.K.F.’s Food and Society Initiative transi-
tioned from its initial focus on conservation and 
sustainable agriculture to healthy, green, fair, and 
affordable food. Additionally, the focus of the 
Farm Bill efforts on nutrition and diversity issues 
served to create a better fit within W.K.K.F.’s new 
mission to assist vulnerable children.
The five core grantees that constituted the FFPP 
represented issues concerning sustainable agricul-
ture, conservation, community-based food system 
and food security, regionalism, and Black farmer 
issues. Four of the five were Washington, D.C.-
based and had substantial experience advocating 
legislatively and within the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. The fifth grantee did not have this 
capacity, which was evident. However, because 
it was a coalition of many local and state groups, 
it was able to obtain feedback from grassroots 
constituents about policy ideas and possible 
impacts in a timely manner. Furthermore, all five 
core grantees subcontracted with national, state, 
and local groups to deepen their reach on issues 
of interest to them and to broaden their reach 
especially into nutrition and public health.
FFPP involved a set of interests that spanned a 
significant set of issues, but the members’ power 
to inform and influence public policy varied 
significantly. Moreover, the collective power was 
considerably less compared with non-FFPP Farm 
Bill stakeholders such as the farm commodity 
groups and large farm trade organizations. In ad-
dition, many of the large antihunger groups were 
not aligned with FFPP. Though some were sym-
pathetic to FFPP issues, the FFPP did not offer 
the antihunger groups sufficient guarantees that 
the poverty-related issue they were addressing — 
hunger — was addressed more fully addressed by 
the FFPP than by the non-FFPP stakeholders.
Funders. Unlike the SCHIP issue, W.K.K.F. for 
several years had been (and continues to be) the 
lead funder of groups working on sustainable 
agriculture issues, including the federal Farm  
Bill.4 Though other funders were involved on key 
aspects of the farm bill (e.g., the conservation 
provisions or the antihunger/nutrition provi-
sions), W.K.K.F. did not work closely with them 
on it.
The learning for W.K.K.F. and others is that sup-
porting the right stakeholders is critical. W.K.K.F. 
made a significant leap from the last Farm Bill in 
this regard. Its next leap is to support stakehold-
ers that will add value to coalition members, 
helping them make individual and collective 
gains. From a project’s inception, potential 
partners need to assess whether the partnership 
will be sufficiently valuable to encourage them to 
participate.
4 In a recent report that Headwaters and the Sustainable 
Agriculture and Food Systems Funders Network prepared 
for W.K.K.F., of the $213.6 million awarded for sustain-
able food systems work between 2003 and 2006, W.K.K.F. 
was the most significant private funder — 43 percent of all 
private funding and 25 percent of total funding. Though 
significant, W.K.K.F.’s role has shrunk slightly from the 
previous four-year period, when it represented 45 percent 
of all reported private foundation funding.
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The potential learning around these 
processes for the funder, grantee, 
other stakeholders, and evaluator 
offers the opportunity to further 
build trust, candor, and more 
effective strategies to address the 
underlying wicked problems.
Conclusion
Permanent solutions to the challenging social 
problems like poverty, and the multiple ways 
poverty affects individuals and society, such as 
children without health insurance and access to 
healthy food grown in environmentally sustain-
able manner, remain elusive. The nonprofit 
advocacy community, its foundation supporters, 
and many others use public policy to help address 
these issues. The wicked problems frame provides 
a way for funders and the groups with whom 
they work to approach the issues differently and 
together work through the issues presented by 
these complex subjects. It calls upon the funders 
to provide leadership that ensures stakeholder 
involvement and foster a culture of candor among 
the stakeholders including, and especially, its 
grantees.
By focusing on aspects of its own grantmak-
ing processes that either attract or disempower 
potential nonprofit stakeholders — defining the 
issue, identifying the “right” outcomes, involving 
others in those early efforts, and communicating 
what it seeks to the possible grantees — a funder 
can gain greater clarity about what is possible. 
Such clarity can provide a much better idea of 
how to structure an evaluation that will enhance 
learning for the funder, its grantees, and other 
stakeholders.
The wicked problems framework also can en-
sure that evaluators include in their evaluation 
methodology an assessment of the quality of 
leadership, degree of candor, and level of stake-
holder involvement from the earliest aspects of 
a grantmaking program to its completion and 
re-envisioning. The potential learning around 
these processes for the funder, grantee, other 
stakeholders, and evaluator offers the opportunity 
to further build trust, candor, and more effec-
tive strategies to address the underlying wicked 
problems.
The Atlantic and W.K.K.F. case studies reveal 
that the funders approached their work with 
clear ideas about what needed to be done and 
some of the processes they wanted grantees to 
use in pursuit of the policy objectives. Both paid 
attention to their stakeholders in many ways, and 
both attempted to be clear with heir stakehold-
ers before and after they became grantees. As in 
any effort, each funder’s grantees achieved some 
of their objectives and fell short in others.Given 
the wickedness of problems each funder is facing, 
there will unfortunatey be plenty of time to retool 
strategis for the next round of policy making.
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